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Consider how you can think of yourself in two different ways. On the one hand, 
you can think of yourself as a body in space and time, apt to displace water in 
the bathtub and benefitting from airbags in the event of an automobile accident. 
On the other hand, you can think of yourself as a locus of mental life (emotions, 
sensations, thoughts, and consciousness). The intuition that these two ways of 
thinking of yourself are incommensurable introduces a kind of dualism. On this 
view, my consciousness, subjective and immediate, could never be a mere physi-
cal process occurring in my body; my feeling of pain, or existential ennui, could 
surely not be seen, or comprehended in the rich and immediate way I do, by a 
third party with a scalpel and a microscope. We can cultivate this dualistic intu-
ition by considering the seeming possibility of a consciousness which exists (in 
some sense) in the absence of any body.
　　In response, Descartes (1641) posited two kinds of substance, non-physical 
mind and material body, while Leibniz (1714: §17) posited mental and physical 
realms. This differentiation is in various ways enshrined in our language and 
ways of thinking, but dualism faces the challenge of explaining how mind and 
material (spirit and flesh, soul and body) interact. That is, we must give some ac-
count of how when the body is touched, the mind registers a sensation; of how 
when the mind wills an action, the body moves. Princess Elisabeth of the 
Palatinate wrote to Descartes in 1643 (see for example Shapiro 2008) and argued 
the need for such an account, and a satisfactory answer is seemingly yet to be 
given. This tension between the dualistic intuition that mind is somehow com-
pletely different from base matter, and the need to give an account of how this 
special mind interacts with base matter, is the root of the mind-body problem.
　　The natural way to characterize the problematic interactions between physi-
cal and non-physical is causal: the touch causes the sensation, and the will causes 
the movement. However, being both affected by physical causes and a cause of 
physical effects would seem to be a reasonable definition of what it is to be physi-
cal. If so, the mind is either physical and causally potent, or non-physical and 
causally impotent. Put another way, if physical effects always have physical 
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causes, then any non-physical events are causally impotent in the physical world. 
A non-physical mind that is unaffected by the physical world and has no effect 
on the physical world seems to have no explanatory or predictive value ... in 
which case we’d presumably be better off not positing it in the first place.
　　Indeed, as our understanding of the information processing functions of ner-
vous systems (of cognitive science and neuroscience, of the physical causal chains 
involved in cognition) improves, there seems to be ever less need or space for a 
mysterious non-physical mind stuff. If, for example, we can gain a complete un-
derstanding of the behaviour of a simple organism (say, the C. elegans round-
worm being simulated at OpenWorm.org) using a bottom-up comprehensive com-
putational simulation of the causal system consisting of its cells and immediate 
environment, then we have a purely physical causal story of how complex behav-
iour can arise without mind stuff. With roughly 1000 cells the millimetre-long C. 
elegans solves basic problems to crawl and swim about feeding, finding mates, 
and avoiding predators. More complex animals with more cells can display more 
complex behaviours, but our understanding of evolutionary biology leads us to 
expect the same kinds of physical causal systems: more cells, more connections. 
While there may be interesting discontinuities or watersheds along our phyloge-
netic branch of evolutionary history, or during individual ontogeny ‒ becoming 
multicellular, gaining the first neuron or certain formats of intercellular connec-
tion that enable new forms of processing, and so on ‒ there is simply no need or 
space for the sudden appearance of a new mental substance.
　　Now, all this discussion of neurons, computational simulation, and evolution-
ary biology prompts an easy response to the confusion over what the mind is: 
perhaps it’s just the brain. On this view, if the mind is not some spooky non-
physical stuff with no explanatory or predictive value, then it’s physical stuff that 
is apt for causal, scientific study. We know that the mind and the brain are close-
ly connected: changes to the brain, for example through growth or injury or the 
application of chemicals, can be intimately and systematically mind-altering. On 
this view, while the traditional concepts of mind and brain may be distinct (we 
wouldn’t talk of a mind-surgeon, or of eating lamb’s mind for dinner), we have 
now discovered that the mind is in fact the brain.
　　However, there are a number of reasons to think that minds are not simply 
brains.
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1.   Minds include non-brain bits of the body, and don’t include 
some bits of the brain
Firstly, while the mind and the brain are clearly closely connected, and this con-
nection motivates us to identify minds as brains, there doesn’t seem to be any 
principled way of making out which parts of the nervous system exactly we 
ought to include. Presumably neurons in the brain are part of the mind, because 
they are directly involved in the relevant activities (input-output cognitive pro-
cessing). Perhaps the bones of the skull are not part of the mind, playing at most 
an indirect support role ... but these relevant mindful activities would not occur if 
the bones were removed, since brains not fixed in formalin have something like 
the consistency of cold porridge. Likewise, perhaps the blood vessels are not part 
of the mind, since they play a support role ... but all activity would cease quickly 
without them. Any account of the mind-as-brain needs to give a principled ac-
count of what structures are in the mind, and which not, and why.
　　Further, various parts of the body which are not part of the brain have a 
prima facie claim to be included in the mind. An obvious candidate is the entire 
spinal column, which sits inside what is essentially the same protective mem-
brane as the brain (the meninges), includes about one hundred million neurons, 
and processes information in much the same way that the brain does. Good can-
didates include the eyes, retinas, and the optical nerves, as these are intimately 
involved in early visual processing. Less obvious but still credible candidates in-
clude muscles (for example, people who frown during cognitive activity try hard-
er and experience more cognitive strain, and forcing a smile can improve mood, 
seemingly indicating that the muscles of the face are involved in cognition; see 
for example Kahneman 2011, chapter 12). Indeed, even if neurons are privileged 
in some way that precludes muscles and blood vessels being considered part of 
the mind, the enteric nervous system (running through the gastrointestinal tract) 
contains about five hundred million neurons, about as many as the whole brain of 
a marmoset. A good final example might be the chemicals influencing the physi-
ology of the brain and firing of neurons: the various structures around the body 
creating and regulating these chemicals ultimately play an important role in cog-
nition too.
　　There’s no great mystery here. If we use a digital computing analogy for the 
mind, the brain corresponds to the CPU. But this is a CPU which has spent sev-
eral million years co-evolving with all the input, output, and memory systems of 
a specific chassis (a social, sexual chassis), such that the successful operation of 
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the CPU depends intimately on specific characteristics of those co-evolved sys-
tems, and we can be genuinely unsure as to where the CPU ends and input/out-
put/memory systems begin; or, put another way, the non-CPU components play 
critical roles structuring inputs and outputs, such that any story about how infor-
mation processing occurs needs to include these non-CPU components. Indeed, if 
we use instead a more biologically appropriate connectionist (parallel distributed 
processor or neural network) computer analogy for the mind, there is no CPU. 
Instead, processing occurs as patterns of activation spread across layers of nodes, 
and a characterization of the system needs to include all levels from input (large-
ly sensory receptors) to output, without any necessary privileging of the levels 
which happen to be inside the skull.
　　My own opinion here is that as our appreciation for the complex interactions 
involved in the development and operation of the human body develops, we will 
feel less and less able to draw the sharp distinction between ‘important for cogni-
tive processing ’ and ‘not important for cognitive processing ’ which the 
mind=brain claim requires. The central nervous system outruns the brain; the 
peripheral nervous system outruns the central nervous system; and both are tied 
into complex physical and chemical systems extending around the body without 
which they would not function. If there is any principled way of making out what 
should be in or out with regard to ‘important for cognitive processing’, it may be 
at the boundary of the organism as a whole. That is, minds may be something 
that people have, not that brains are.
2.   Minds include bits of the world outside not only the brain 
but also the body
One sense in which minds could include bits of the world might be if minds are 
essentially relational. There need be nothing spookily dualistic about relational 
concepts: for example, a ‘brother’ is a brother not by virtue of its own intrinsic 
properties (for example, being male), but also in virtue of standing in a particular 
relation to another thing (a sibling). Siegel (2016), for example, argues that mind is 
relational: that mind involves a sense of self in contrast to and as mirroring other 
people, and a flow of information between the self and others. Though interest-
ing, Siegel’s arguments seem to mostly be that putting the social nature of minds 
central stage has psychological and clinical returns (for example, encouraging 
empathy over competition, and belonging over solitude). Still, at the very least, 
Siegel’s position serves to remind us that making sense of minds requires us to 
refer to the world, and especially to other people and social or cultural constructs 
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such as language.
　　Unsurprisingly, philosophers have made similar points. Wittgenstein (1953: 
§243-315) argued that the idea of a private language is inconsistent: that lan-
guage serves a social function and is tied to public (social, shared) criteria of use. 
With mental terms tied to behavioural criteria, even something as superficially 
simple as ‘I think ...’ can only be understood by bringing a rich social context of 
interpersonal identity and behavioural ‒ meaning physical ‒ criteria into view. As 
for Siegel, for Wittgenstein the mind is embodied and richly social.
　　Putnam (1973) and Burge (1979) argued for a position called semantic exter-
nalism ‒ basically, that meanings are not entirely determined by something in 
the head, since they can change with contingent facts about the world (for 
Putnam, the microstructure of natural kinds; for Burge, the beliefs of others in 
my community) even as everything in the head is held constant. If semantic ex-
ternalism is correct ‒ and the broad consensus amongst philosophers seems to be 
that it is ‒ then making out mental content requires reference to the world out-
side the head.
　　My own opinion here is that getting any explanatory handle on the mind re-
quires reference to rich social and linguistic facts (not to mention historical facts 
‒ given that minds develop over time, and have evolved in some historical envi-
ronment, even making out the basic fact that something is a fear rather than a 
hope seems to require bringing into view how fears and hopes have properly 
functioned historically in ancestral minds). However, I am not convinced that ex-
planation requiring reference to the world constitutes minds ‘including’ these 
parts of the world: after all, understanding the kidney arguably requires refer-
ence to the organism as a whole (a kidney which does not serve to filter the 
blood of an organism is no kidney), but the kidney does not thereby ‘include’ the 
whole organism. Still, a kidney without an organism is not a (true, functioning) 
kidney, and in a similar way, a mind without a society is not a (true, functioning) 
mind.
　　There may be another simpler way in which minds could include bits of the 
world (other than brains and people): if minds include aids to cognition, for exam-
ple to memory, to calculation, and to visualization. On this view, when I use a 
pencil and paper to diagram a problem in geometry, my scribblings become nec-
essary to giving a full and comprehensible account of my cognitive activity, and 
therefore are to be considered a temporary part of my mind. Books and search 
engines can presumably do likewise; and even more interestingly, if pencil and 
paper or books can be made out as parts of my mind, then surely other people 
can too, for I can gain information, bounce questions, chant oral history contra-
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puntally, and generally engage synergistically with other people. And if other in-
dividuals can be intermittently parts of my mind, then presumably intermittent 
parts of their mind become parts of mine too, as my expert asks her expert, and 
so on.
　　There is, I think, something to be said for this view. Scribblings on paper 
might seem the wrong kind of thing to be part of my mind, since I don’t have di-
rect introspective access to them. But brain activity is not as unified and coher-
ent as our subjective experience might suggest: Freud suggested in the 1900s 
that 90% of the mind was non-conscious, and subsequent neurological studies 
show the brain as a mess of competing interpretations and calls for action which 
riot continuously, with only the winner of the moment becoming available to con-
scious introspection. I don't have direct introspective access to these non-con-
scious subsystems of my mind, and I am not necessarily aware of where or even 
when they occur even should some output win its way to consciousness. Since I 
don’t have direct introspective access to most of my mind, not having direct in-
trospective access to the entirety of a process (because some of it is on paper, or 
involves another person) cannot disqualify it from being part of my mind.
　　The idea that minds can include bits of the world also, I think, helps future-
proof our concept of mind. It is easy enough to imagine some small artificial 
pseudo-neuronal structure added to the brain, perhaps to return function after 
damage. As something in the head and neuron-like, and even functionally identi-
cal to the old neurons, we would presumably want to allow that this is part of 
the mind. But then it is surely easy to extend our imagining to structures further 
and further removed, in location or similarity to neurons. For example, technical 
constraints might mean we need to add the prosthesis inside the skull but dis-
placing some other structure; or that we use transmitters inside the damaged 
brain and locate the artificial neurons just outside the skull but under the skin; or 
attached to the outside of the skin; or in a nearby device; or somewhere in the 
cloud. It may be that I’ve simply read more than my fair share of science fiction, 
but I don’t see any convincing point on the continuum from small artificial pseu-
do-neuronal structure added to the brain through to having a head full of trans-
mitters and a mind in the cloud where I’d want to deny that it can be part of the 
mind. An acknowledgement now that external cognitive aids can be parts of the 
mind, even if only temporary and peripheral, might be good preparation for such 
a world.
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3.  Beings without brains could have minds
Imagine that you test your new X-ray specs by peeping inside your two best 
friends’ heads, and discover they have no brains: their heads are full instead of 
(respectively) electronics and intestines, and they admit that are (respectively) an 
android and an alien. Since they have given an extensive display of appropriate 
behaviour over the last decades, you must presumably grant that they have 
minds (can understand, have some mental states), despite being literally brain-
less.
　　This possibility shows at least that the mind is not identical to the brain: if 
there might be cases where there is a mind without a brain, then minds are not 
identical to brains. Mental states and minds, defined by their functions in cogni-
tion rather than their substrate, can be realized in multiple ways. But there is 
still an interesting sense in which minds could be brains: that of role-filling or of-
fice-occupancy. That is, minds may be something like ‘whatever substrate cen-
trally serves to enable cognitive processes’ or ‘whatever is casually most relevant 
to adaptive behaviour’, a role which happens to be filled by the brain in humans 
(though see above for doubts about whether this is true!). In this case, the mind 
is the brain for humans, just as the mind is some other organ for your best 
friends.
　　My own opinion here is that this ‘the mind is the brain, at least for us’ way 
of thinking is not helpful. Consider that when you and your friends want a beer, 
there are three very different realizations: as a brain process, an electronic pro-
cess, and so on. As I say of each person ‘they want a beer’, I don’t thereby mean 
the underlying process, for I have no idea of what those might be, and I mean 
something very similar with each utterance, while your underlying processes dif-
fer wildly. The only way to make out what the three realizations of ‘wanting a 
beer’ have in common is not via the processing substrates, which are varied and 
unknown to me, but through the behaviour that shows a functional description of 
that mental state is satisfied, and which the three of you have in common.
　　To return again to a digital computing analogy, the same application (say, a 
web browser) may run on a variety of different architectures (say, my iOS tablet, 
my Linux desktop, and my Android smartphone). We may be ignorant of the de-
tails of the architectures, or even what and where they are. In order to make out 
how my talk of having made the same settings across all my devices is anything 
other rather than three separate and utterly different claims about computing 
architecture, we must have it that I am talking about the behaviour of all three 
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devices satisfying the same functional description, and not talking about the pro-
cessing substrates. In the case of you three wanting beers, I know how and when 
to judge that a person wants an object: all else being equal, they will tend to look 
at it with interest when it is in sight, reach for it, affirm a want if asked, and so 
on. I may also guess that you all want beers simply because it is hot and if I 
were you I would want a beer. Without giving it any conscious thought at all, I 
may defeasibly infer that you want beers and hold some up for your attention, 
and so long as your behaviour satisfies the folk psychological script for ‘wanting’, 
I properly judge that you all want beers. Insofar as having a mind is connected 
to having mental states, I thereby properly judge that you have minds on the ba-
sis of your behaviours.
　　Note that in some ways this may seem to be a behaviourist definition of 
mind, because after all, I properly judge that you have a mind on the basis of 
only your behaviour. However, the distinctive claim of behaviourism is that refer-
ence to mental events or states ought to be avoided entirely (see for example 
Skinner 1974), or at least subsequently cashed out entirely as behavioural con-
cepts, and we are not attempting to do that. Indeed, the folk psychological script 
for ‘wanting’ adverts to a range of other mental states: you will reach for the ob-
ject only if you believe that it is the object you want, and so on. Indeed, as a re-
sponsible host, when I hold up the beers I infer you want, I will be sensitive to 
signs that may reveal subtle conflicts in your wanting: do you want the beer but 
not want to want the beer (you’re a recovering addict), do you not want the beer 
but want to please me by accepting it (I’m pressuring you to drink), do you want 
the beer but not want to impose or be obliged to me, would you prefer some oth-
er drink, and so on. For all that my ascribing mental states to you is based on 
your behaviour, the folk psychological script commits me to a huge complex of 
possible mental states and a network of interactions between mental states that 
would be anathema to a behaviourist.
　　If this analysis is correct, to have a mind is to follow or be apt to follow some 
of these mental state scripts, whether you have a brain or not. Simple minds, for 
example those of cats, may be apt to follow only a restricted subset of mental 
state scripts (believing, wanting, fearing, and so on), with even those scripts tak-
ing only restricted types of content: my cat can fear a dog, but not that a dog 
might come tomorrow; can want an unhealthy snack, but not want not to want 
an unhealthy snack. Fuller minds are apt to follow more of the folk psychological 
scripts, and are thereby apt for attributions of self-reflection (you regret killing 
my cat), mental states with abstract conceptual content (you wonder how the 
body could best be disposed of), reciprocal use of folk psychological scripts (you 
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believe that I am upset), and so on.
　　In either case, minds are not brains, or even really things at all; they are 
something like the state of satisfying a certain type of functional explanation and 
prediction. There is no spooky stuff here. Being say, a racecar, is similar. Any 
racecar should fulfil a range of functional scripts (can go fast, turn at speed, and 
so on). Even if the technology of the time means these are invariably subserved 
or enabled by a gasoline engine, a racecar is not just a gasoline engine. A gaso-
line engine without the surrounding car is no racecar, and a racecar with an elec-
tric motor would still be a racecar. We identify racecars through their speed (and 
so on) without having to check their engine. Just because we have no noun for 
the state of satisfying racecar functional script descriptions (having ‘racecar-
ness’?) and do have a noun for the state of satisfying mental functional script de-
scriptions (having ‘a mind’) doesn’t mean that there is a thing to be made out in 
the latter case.
4.  Minds and brains have different explanatory levels
The discussion above of how mental state talk is not the same as brain talk, just 
as computer applications talk is not the same as processing substrate talk, points 
to a version of the argument against mind-brain identity that does not depend on 
any intuition that androids and aliens can have minds.
　　Application talk brings particular objects and interactions to our attention: 
for example, as a designer, that having only one primary action per screen im-
proves user comprehension, adding comprehensive comments to code makes 
maintenance easier later, letting users know that you’ve automatically detected 
their credit card type reduces support staff load, and so on. Applications running 
on my smartphone do not have some spooky substance that is distinct from the 
smartphone, and I’m not a dualist about applications. The application running 
may be a physical process that centres on the movement of electrons through 
conducting and semi-conducting materials within my smartphone. But for us to 
understand what makes a good application, explain what an application does or 
how it can be improved, or predict what will happen next as we interact with a 
new application, we need application talk, not substrate talk. The explanatory 
and predictive fact that there is something on the screen that looks like a button 
to a user is incomprehensible to a bottom-up view. That is, a complete descrip-
tion of the physical state of the smartphone presumably determines that there is 
a button on screen, but the massive disjunction of possible states that represent 
clear buttons is comprehensible as something unitary (as all being about some-
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thing visibly buttony on screen) only by talking about how the screen will appear 
to a user and how button-like it is. Users and designers need to understand but-
tons, and how buttons look to users (and user goals and competing apps and so 
on), not semiconducting substrates.
　　Of course, there is nothing unique about application talk. Economics draws 
our attention to supplies, demands, exchange rates, currencies, and so on; folk 
psychology draws our attention to beliefs, wants, regrets, and so on. The entities 
and interactions which are explanatory and predictive depend on the domain. 
Understanding and predicting currency fluctuations requires talk of market sup-
ply and confidence and the actions of banks, not of atoms and electromagnetic 
fields. Understanding and predicting the behaviour of people requires talk of be-
liefs and wants, not of dendrites and electrons. Minds are not brains (applications 
are not patterns of smartphone charge, the US dollar is not a bunch of atoms and 
EM fields) because they are objects at different explanatory levels.
　　The reductionist tendency mentioned at the start of this article argues that 
physical chemistry can be understood in terms of atomic physics, cell biology in 
terms of how biological molecules work, and organisms in terms of how their 
component cell systems interact. Minsky (2007) argues that while we cannot yet 
see how to reduce minds to neuroscience (let alone fundamental physics, presum-
ably), nothing is irreducible: we’re just not smart enough to reduce it yet. For 
Minsky, with enough intermediary explanatory levels between brain cells and 
high-level mental states (for example, how brain cells combine to make logic 
gates, logic gates combine to make reasoning modules, modules combine to make 
mind ‒ perhaps with thousands of levels and modules), we should be able to un-
derstand how mind arises from brain.
　　My own opinion here is that Minsky’s view is suitably aspirational, but may 
ignore in-principle limitations on bottom-up understanding. For example, consider 
the three-body problem in physics. This is a dynamical system which is chaotic, 
meaning there is no general analytic solution. Predicting how a particular system 
will develop essentially requires simulation of the system’s development over 
time, which is computationally demanding, and can yield results which are only 
ever arbitrarily ‒ as against perfectly ‒ accurate. If laborious simulation using 
such numerical methods does not constitute the kind of ‘understanding’ required 
for useful explanation and prediction, then the motion of three point masses in 
space has eluded our understanding despite concerted effort since Newton’s 1687 
Principia.
　　Neural networks (Minsky’s modules, say) can be similarly chaotic. If multiple 
such modules are linked, as they are in Minsky’s model of the mind, the chaotic 
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output of one module (which we can laboriously simulate only to non-perfect ac-
curacy) can form the input of another module, which we can then simulate less 
accurately as we have non-perfect understanding of its inputs. With even two 
modules, let alone thousands to comprise just one mind, simulation rapidly be-
comes computationally intractable. As noted above, we are now struggling to see 
how the behaviour of C. elegans emerges from interactions amongst its 1000 
cells. A mouse has about 12 million times as many cells as that, and humans like-
ly have over 37 billion times as many. If there are in principle limits to our un-
derstanding of three masses governed by gravity, we might expect in principle 
limits to our understanding of the development of systems of 37 trillion cells gov-
erned by complex electrochemical interactions, the development of which de-
pends on interactions with multiple other systems of 37 trillion cells.
　　With computationally intractable systems, the quickest way to see how the 
system will develop is to watch it develop, and the best way to gain an explana-
tory and predictive handle on it is generally to search for statistical regularities 
in its behaviour as a system. This is something like traditional weather forecast-
ing: while there is no bottom-up understanding to be had, we may note after long 
experience that, for example, low pressure zones in the east tend to be followed 
by rain in the foothills two days later. The laws of physics govern the dynamical 
system of the weather, without giving us access to emergent regularities of that 
system. Ultimately, even if Minsky’s bottom-up mind approach ends up able to 
slog out a reductive account of how we can cash out some mental states in terms 
of neurophysiology, this would be something like being told that a supercomput-
er has successfully shown how a hurricane developed using molecular motion 
data. Exciting, and doubtless calling to our attention on the way various fascinat-
ing levels of explanation and structures, and a triumph for physicalism over the 
ancient dualism of Descartes and Leibniz ... but not apt to make me give up my 
talk of pressure zones in the east for molecular motion talk. Understanding, ex-
planation, and prediction need to occur in real time with limited data and compu-
tational resources, and a proof that in principle a massively powerful computer 
will eventually be able to derive my feeling of ennui from a massively accurate 
scan of me does not help me figure out in real time if you three all want beers.
　　Fortunately, folk psychology is remarkably successful in explaining and pre-
dicting behaviour. Not only can I judge if you all want beers without conscious 
effort, I regularly make successful predictions that would be simply astonishing 
from a bottom-up view. For example, you promise that you’ll be at my birthday 
party in a year, and I predict confidently and without particular effort that you 
will be (we’re good friends, and you like my parties). Sure enough, a year later, 
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there you are. Remembering that the bottom-up view has trouble figuring out 
where three point masses in an idealised space will end up after a finite time, 
there is simply no way that even a precise understanding of all whatever swathe 
of molecular motion and charges are taken as the initial condition can be used to 
predict your location in a year, during which time you may have flown around 
the world and interacted with thousands of other equally complex systems.
Conclusion
The mind is not a spooky special substance. This recognition seems to encourage 
us towards a view whereby mental states are merely brain states, and mind is 
merely the collection of brain states.
　　However, the mind is not simply the brain. Revisiting the four discussions 
above:
1. There is no principled way to make out that all and only the brain subserves 
or enables mental states. If minds are had by anything, its people, not brains.
2. Getting any explanatory handle on the mind (for example, the content of 
mental states) requires reference to rich social facts. In fact, we might want 
to allow that parts of the world outside the body (let alone the brain) literally 
become parts of the mind.
3. Mental states without brain states seem possible. Indeed, mind talk depends 
on satisfying certain functional scripts, not on brain states. This suggests 
that minds are not things at all, but something like the state of satisfying a 
certain type of functional explanation and prediction.
4. Minds and brains have different explanatory levels. Even if all mental facts 
are determined by brain facts, mental facts are apt to help us in understand-
ing, explaining, and predicting behaviour in a way that even a supercomput-
er cannot derive from brain facts.
Brain-centred views underestimate the importance of the embodied and social as-
pects of the mental. Brain-centred views ignore actual and possible (likely near-
future) ways that the mental outruns brains. And expecting mental talk to disap-
pear in favour of neuroscientific or physicochemical talk seriously overestimates 
the actual and in-principle possible (let alone practical) understanding available on 
a bottom-up view, while seriously underestimating the explanatory and predic-
tive power of mental talk.
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